Human System Risk Management for Space Flight by Davis, Jeffrey
Human	System	Risk	Management	for	Space	Flight	
	
This	brief	abstract	reviews	the	development	of	the	current	day	approach	to	human	
system	risk	management	for	space	flight	and	the	development	of	the	critical	
components	of	this	process	over	the	past	few	years.			The	human	system	risk	
management	process	now	provides	a	comprehensive	assessment	of	each	human	
system	risk	by	design	reference	mission	(DRM)	and	is	evaluated	not	only	for	
mission	success	but	also	for	long‐term	health	impacts	for	the	astronauts.	
	
The	discipline	of	bioastronautics	is	the	study	of	the	biological	and	medical	effects	of	
space	flight	on	humans.		In	1997,	the	Space	Life	Sciences	Directorate	(SLSD)		
initiated	the	Bioastronautics	Roadmap	(Roadmap)	as	the	“Critical	Path	Roadmap”,	
and	in	1998	participation	in	the	roadmap	was	expanded	to	include	the	National	
Space	Biomedical	Research	Institute	(NSBRI)	and	the	external	community.		A	total	of	
55	risks	and	250	questions	were	identified	and	prioritized	and	in	2000,	the	
Roadmap	was	baselined	and	put	under	configuration	control.			The	Roadmap	took	
into	account	several	major	advisory	committee	reviews	including	the	Institute	of	
Medicine	(IOM)	“Safe	Passage:	Astronaut	care	for	Exploration	Missions”,	2001.		
Subsequently,	three	collaborating	organizations	at	NASA	HQ	(Chief	Health	and	
Medical	Officer,	Office	of	Space	Flight	and	Office	of	Biological	&	Physical	Research),	
published	the	Bioastronautics	Strategy	in	2003,	that	identified	the	human	as	a	
“critical	subsystem	of	space	flight”	and	noted	that	“tolerance	limits	and	safe	
operating	bands	must	be	established”	to	enable	human	space	flight.		These	offices	
also	requested	a	review	by	the	IOM	of	the	Roadmap	and	that	review	was	published	
in	October	2005	as	“A	Risk	Reduction	Strategy	for	Human	Exploration	of	Space:	A	
Review	of	NASA's	Bioastronautics	Roadmap”,	that	noted	several	strengths	and	
weaknesses	of	the	Roadmap	and	made	several	recommendations.	
	
					In	parallel	with	the	development	of	the	Roadmap,	the	Office	of	the	Chief	Health	
and	Medical	Officer	(OCHMO)	began	a	process	in	2004	of	evaluating	the	tolerance	
limits	and	safe	operating	bands	called	for	in	the	Bioastronautics	Strategy.		Over	the	
next	several	years,	the	concept	of	the	“operating	bands”	were	turned	into	Space	
Flight	Human	System	Standards	(SFHSS),	developed	by	the	technical	resources	of	
the	SLSD	at	the	NASA	Johnson	Space	Center	(JSC).		These	standards	were	developed	
and	reviewed	at	the	SLSD	and	then	presented	to	the	OCHMO	for	acceptance.		The	
first	set	of	standards	was	published	in	2007	as	the	NASA‐STD‐3001,	Volume	1,	Crew	
Health	that	elaborated	standards	for	several	physiological	areas	such	as	
cardiovascular,	musculoskeletal,	radiation	exposure	and	nutrition.		Volume	2,	
Human	Factors,	Habitability	and	Human	Health	was	published	in	2011,	along	with	
development	guidance	in	the	Human	Integration	Design	Handbook	(HIDH).		Taken	
together,	the	SFHSS	Volumes	1	and	2,	and	the	HIDH	replaced	the	NASA‐STD‐3000	
with	new	standards	and	revisions	of	the	older	document.	
	
Three	other	changes	were	also	taking	place	that	facilitated	the	development	of	the	
human	system	risk	management	approach.		In	2005,	the	life	sciences	research	and	
development	portfolio	underwent	a	comprehensive	review	through	the	Exploration	
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Systems	Architecture	Study	(ESAS)	that	resulted	in	the	reformulation	of	the	
Bioastronautics	Program	into	Human	Research	Program	(HRP)	that	was	focused	on	
appropriate	mitigation	results	for	high	priority	human	health	risks.	The	baseline	
HRP	budget	was	established	in	August	2005.		In	addition,	the	OCHMO	formulated	
the	Health	and	Medical	Technical	Authority	(HMTA)	in	2006	that	established	the	
position	of	the	Chief	Medical	Officer	(CMO)	at	the	NASA	JSC	along	with	other	key	
technical	disciplines	,	and	the	OCHMO	became	the	responsible	office	for	the	SFHSS	
as	noted	above.		The	final	change	was	the	establishment	in	2008	of	the	Human	
System	Risk	Board	(HSRB),	chaired	by	the	CMO	with	representation	from	the	HRP,	
SLSD	management	and	technical	experts.		The	HSRB	then	began	to	review	all	human	
system	risks,	established	a	comprehensive	risk	management	and	configuration	
management	plan	and	data	sharing	policy.			These	major	developments	of	standards,	
the	HRP,	the	HMTA	and	a	forum	for	review	of	human	system	risks	(HSRB)	facilitated	
the	integration	of	human	research,	medical	operations,	systems	engineering	and	
many	other	disciplines	in	the	comprehensive	review	of	human	system	risks.	
	
The	HSRB	began	a	comprehensive	review	of	all	potential	inflight	medical	conditions	
and	events	and	over	the	course	of	several	reviews	consolidated	the	number	of	
human	system	risks	to	30	where	the	greatest	emphasis	is	placed	for	investing	
program	dollars	for	risk	mitigation.		The	HSRB	considers	all	available	evidence	from	
human	research,	medical	operations	and	occupational	surveillance	in	assessing	the	
risks	for	appropriate	mitigation	and	future	work.		All	applicable	DRMs	(low	earth	
orbit	6	and	12	months,	deep	space	sortie	for	30	days	and	1	year,	a	one	year	lunar	
mission,	and	a	planetary	mission	for	3	years)	are	considered	as	human	system	risks	
are	modified	by	the	hazards	associated	with	space	flight	such	as	microgravity,	
exposure	to	radiation,	distance	from	the	earth,	isolation	and	a	closed	environment.			
Each	risk	has	a	summary	assessment	representing	the	state	of	knowledge/evidence	
base	for	that	risk,	the	available	risk	mitigations,	traceability	to	the	SFHSS	and	
program	requirements,	and	future	work	required.		These	data	then	can	drive	
coordinated	budgets	across	the	HRP,	the	International	Space	Station,	Crew	Health	
and	Safety	and	Advanced	Exploration	System	budgets.			
	
These	risk	assessments	were	completed	for	6	DRMs	in	December	of	2014	and	serve	
as	the	baseline	for	which	subsequent	research	and	technology	development	and	
crew	health	care	portfolios	can	be	assessed.		The	HSRB	will	review	each	risk	at	least	
annually	and	especially	when	new	information	is	available	that	must	be	considered	
for	effective	risk	mitigation.		The	current	status	of	each	risk	can	be	reported	to	
program	management	for	operations,	budget	reviews	and	general	oversight	of	the	
human	system	risk	management	program.			
